How agent-based protection works¶
Agent-based microsegmentation uses a lightweight agent on workloads to enforce policy locally.
Components¶
- Workloads (agents): hosts with an agent enforcing policy
- PCE (Policy Compute Engine): policy authority and distribution
- Labels: how we express scope (app/env/role/loc/...)
- Rulesets & rules: the policy model (allow/deny + services/ports)
Allow / Block decision model¶
flowchart LR
A[Workload A] -->|Flow attempt| PCE[PCE Policy Engine]
PCE -->|Allowed| B[Workload B]
PCE -->|Blocked| X[Drop / Reject] What really happens¶
At runtime, the decision is enforced on the workload:
1) The agent receives a policy snapshot from the PCE
2) When a new connection is attempted, the agent evaluates: - Source labels, destination labels - Direction (ingress/egress) - Service definition (ports/protocols) - Rules order / ruleset scope 3) The agent allows or blocks the flow
Why this is powerful
Enforcement stays effective even if network paths change, because policy is attached to the workload identity (labels), not an IP topology.
Allowed flow example¶
Use case: App A in PROD calls App B in PROD on TCP/443.
sequenceDiagram
autonumber
participant A as Workload A (app=A, env=PROD)
participant B as Workload B (app=B, env=PROD)
Note over A,B: Policy allows A -> B on TCP/443
A->>B: TCP 443 (HTTPS)
B-->>A: SYN/ACK
Note over A,B: Connection established Blocked flow example¶
Use case: A compromised workload tries to pivot using an admin port (e.g., SSH/22) that is not explicitly allowed.
sequenceDiagram
autonumber
participant A as Workload A (compromised)
participant B as Workload B
Note over A,B: No rule allowing TCP/22
A->>B: TCP 22 (SSH)
Note over A,B: Agent blocks the attempt Common misconception
Blocking “admin ports” is not enough. The goal is to express required flows and restrict everything else.